Thursday, October 29, 2026

The Last Human Summer

A little essay. On physicalism, Nietzsche, Mishima, the aristocracy of the soul, the death of the gods, and why I think we have forgotten what it means to be human.

There is something profoundly strange about the fact that we are here.

Not merely alive, not merely conscious, but here, at this particular moment in the history of the universe, inhabiting bodies constructed from the remnants of dead stars, standing on a thin crust of stone suspended in an almost incomprehensible darkness, possessed of enough intelligence to understand that we are going to die and enough stubbornness to continue living anyway.

For billions of years, matter existed without knowing that it existed. Hydrogen accumulated, stars ignited, galaxies collided, planets formed and shattered. Oceans appeared on a small world orbiting an otherwise unremarkable star. Chemistry became biology. Biology developed eyes, teeth, nervous systems, fear, hunger, desire, and memory. Eventually, something astonishing happened: matter began to look back at itself.

And then, perhaps more astonishingly, it began to ask what it ought to do.

The human condition begins with this contradiction. We are physical organisms, entirely dependent upon forces we cannot command, yet we possess an extraordinary capacity to challenge the circumstances of our existence. We are fragile animals with an appetite for eternity. We are temporary arrangements of molecules that produce symphonies, cities, philosophies, cathedrals, wars, gardens, and declarations of love.

We are the universe becoming dissatisfied with what the universe has made.

There is no guarantee that this experiment will continue. We know of no other civilization that can inherit our ambitions. No extraterrestrial intelligence has been confirmed, and although that does not technically establish that humanity is all alone, I truly do think that we are, spare for a divine creator, and therefore should live as though no one is coming to rescue us, for we are not deserving.

We have no confirmed audience beyond ourselves, no visible referee, no references either, no promise that existence is fair. We are born into what might be called a cosmic hardcore mode: one life, irreversible consequences, limited resources, and a world that does not suspend its laws when we make mistakes. We are in Minecraft, essentially, except that the blocks are atoms, the environment can kill us, and there is no guaranteed respawn. Ever.

And yet, look at what we have been given.

Two hands, two legs, eyes capable of recognizing the face of someone we love, a nervous system capable of experiencing terror, sexual ecstasy, melancholy, longing, yearning, sadness, grief, hunger, triumph, and the peculiar peacefulness of sunlight falling across our skin. A brain capable of contemplating infinity while also remaining vulnerable to a single night's insufficient sleep.

The absurdity is almost unbearable.

We possess one of the most intricate forms of agency known to exist, perhaps the strongest that will ever exist, considering it is made out of meat, not metal, and we routinely manage to spend it sitting motionless beneath artificial light, watching other people perform imaginary lives on screens. We have confused the representation of existence with existence itself.

I increasingly suspect that the central philosophical catastrophe of modernity is not simply that humanity has lost its gods, its traditions, or even its moral certainty. It is that humanity has gradually forgotten that it has a body.

And I think nearly everything else follows from that.

The Body and the Soul

Western philosophy has spent centuries attempting to separate the human being from the body that makes the human being possible. Plato distinguished the changing world of sensory experience from the eternal realm of Forms. Christian traditions, despite their theology of incarnation, sometimes developed cultural expressions suspicious of bodily appetite. Descartes gave this division its most influential modern expression: thinking substance on one side, extended material substance on the other.

The result was an extraordinarily seductive idea: somewhere inside this animal, hidden behind its eyes, sits a purer entity. A pilot, an observer, a ghost, a soul. The body is something we possess rather than something that we are.

But consider the evidence of ordinary experience. You cannot think independently of your biological condition. Exhaustion changes the architecture of your judgments. Hunger changes what seems important. Sexual desire reorganizes attention. Physical illness alters the emotional texture of the world. A morning run can transform a problem that seemed intolerable at midnight into something perfectly manageable by breakfast.

Your philosophy is not independent of your blood chemistry, ever. Your personality is not floating above your nervous system. Your courage is not an abstract symbol stored in some metaphysical chamber untouched by your pulse, lungs, and muscles. Your psychological problems are not a bug in the cloud, not a glitch in the system, detached from your bodily problems.

You are an organism. You are a system. I don't consider this an insult. Quite the opposite.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, specifically the chapter "On the Despisers of the Body," Friedrich Nietzsche offers one of the most devastating reversals of this entire philosophical hierarchy:

"Body am I entirely, and nothing more; and soul is only the name of something in the body."

Nietzsche subsequently describes the body as a great intelligence, a plurality somehow organized into a single being. Conscious reasoning is not sovereign; it is a subordinate instrument of something vastly older and more sophisticated.

This is much more radical than the familiar instruction to exercise or maintain one's health. Nietzsche is proposing a reversal in the very location of wisdom. The conscious intellect, so accustomed to imagining itself sovereign, may be a small administrative office within an immeasurably older biological kingdom.

You do not consciously regulate every heartbeat, command each cellular repair process, or design your emotional responses from first principles. You can't. Not by yourself. Your organism predicts dangers, processes information, and coordinates action long before your conscious narration has finished explaining what happened.

What we call instinct is not necessarily wisdom at all. Biological impulses can mislead us, and ancestral preferences can become maladaptive in modern environments. But the deeper point survives: conscious thought is not the whole of intelligence. It is one of intelligence's instruments.

This is where physicalism acquires an unexpectedly spiritual dimension.

If consciousness emerges from the organization and activity of matter, then matter is capable of something far more extraordinary than the old opposition between physical and spiritual existence allowed us to imagine. Matter can suffer. Matter can love. Matter can become conscious of its own limitations and sacrifice its immediate interests for principles existing only as patterns of meaning within other conscious organisms.

What we call the soul might be the organized depth of a living person: memory, attention, character, perception, temperament, desire, and the capacity to direct action.

A melody is not less real because it consists of vibrations. A storm is not less real because it consists of moving air. A human personality is not less real because its existence depends upon the activity of a brain.

To explain something physically is not to explain it away.

And so the apparently materialistic conclusion becomes strangely reverent. The human body deserves cultivation not because it is a temporary container for something superior, but because it is the very place where human existence becomes possible.

We are not ghosts sentenced to inhabit animals.

We are animals capable of becoming magnificent.

Sun, Steel, and the Aristocrat of the Soul

Few modern writers understood the conflict between language and physical existence as intensely as Yukio Mishima.

Mishima grew up immersed in literature, imagination, and intellectual life. Language offered him an astonishing capacity to organize reality without directly confronting it. Through writing, he could describe courage without possessing it, beauty without embodying it, and violence without experiencing it.

Eventually, he came to regard this separation as an existential wound.

In Sun and Steel (1968), Mishima describes his transformation through bodybuilding, physical discipline, sunlight, and the confrontation with material resistance. The work is an extraordinary attempt to develop a language that cannot be spoken: a language of muscle, fatigue, weight, and physical form.

Consider the difference between writing about lifting a heavy stone and actually lifting it. Language allows almost unlimited freedom. You can claim to lift the stone, imagine a heroic version of yourself doing so, or construct elaborate theories about its spiritual significance.

But the stone possesses a devastating intellectual advantage.

It does not care.

Steel cannot be flattered. Gravity cannot be negotiated with. A mountain does not lower its summit because you have a compelling theory of mountaineering, and the ocean does not forgive poor swimming technique because your intentions were admirable. This, I think, is the philosophical function of physical resistance. It forces the organism into an encounter with reality that cannot be indefinitely disguised by narrative. One can deceive oneself about courage, inflate one's intelligence through fashionable ideas, and mistake eloquence for competence. But a hundred kilograms does not become lighter because you have developed a convincing theory of strength.

This is why physical training can become an education in reality. Not because muscles guarantee virtue, but because training establishes a repeated encounter between intention and consequence. You decide to act. The world answers. You adapt or fail.

The important lesson in Sun and Steel is not that one should die dramatically. It is that one should stop postponing embodiment.

And this brings me to Julius Evola.

In Revolt Against the Modern World (1934), particularly its discussion of the "regression of the castes," Evola proposes a civilizational progression from sacred authority to warrior aristocracy, then to mercantile dominance, and finally to a society organized around mass labor and economic production.

His historical model is deeply questionable, and his authoritarian and racial politics are not incidental details. But the underlying sociological question remains interesting: what happens when the ability to accumulate wealth becomes civilization's dominant measure of human excellence?

The priest represents orientation toward the sacred. The warrior represents courage, sovereignty, discipline, and willingness to risk oneself. The merchant represents exchange, calculation, acquisition, and measurable advantage. The laborer represents the indispensable reproduction of material life.

I don't think these are fixed human species. They are recurring modes of activity, and an individual can embody all four.

A civilization needs people capable of contemplating ultimate questions, defending communities, coordinating resources, and producing food, shelter, and infrastructure. The problem arises when one principle subordinates all the others.

Under mercantile supremacy, the question of whether an activity is good gradually gives way to the question of whether it is profitable.

The forest becomes timber inventory. The mountain becomes a development opportunity. The human face becomes a marketing asset. Sex becomes a product. Friendship becomes networking. Attention becomes a commodity. Physical beauty becomes monetizable visibility.

Even rebellion becomes something to sell.

This is where Mark Fisher becomes indispensable.

In Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (2009), Fisher examines the almost total absorption of cultural imagination into capitalist organization. He invokes the observation associated with Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.

His point is not merely that capitalism dominates the economy. It has increasingly become the framework through which alternatives are imagined, evaluated, and ultimately commercialized. Capitalist realism is the condition in which even opposition to the system must find expression through the system's own mechanisms.

A person may despise consumer civilization while expressing that contempt entirely through purchasing decisions. He buys the boots, the jacket, the watch, the survival equipment, the books about warriors, and the clothing of an imagined aristocracy. He acquires the symbols of a life he never actually lives. The merchant has won even inside his rebellion.

Fisher's concept of business ontology is particularly relevant here: the assumption that practically everything, including education, healthcare, and culture, should be administered as though it were a business.

What strikes me is how thoroughly this logic has penetrated the modern conception of the individual. We have begun treating ourselves as enterprises. Health becomes an investment, appearance becomes market positioning, social relationships become networks, and leisure becomes either consumption or productivity recovery.

Even self-improvement is converted into a marketplace of promised transformations. But the purchase is not the transformation. The mountain is still waiting. The work remains undone. The individual has simply acquired another object. This is why I find the idea of an aristocrat of the soul more interesting when separated from hereditary rank or political domination.

True inner aristocracy would be a standard of conduct. The ability to govern oneself before attempting to govern others, resist immediate appetite in favor of long-term purpose, remain composed under pressure, cultivate competence without constant recognition, protect something more vulnerable than oneself, and accept responsibility without inventing excuses.

A man unable to regulate his sleep, anger, finances, addictions, or obligations possesses very little sovereignty, regardless of how intensely he identifies with ancient warriors.

The first kingdom to conquer is the disordered self.

And this kind of aristocracy remains available to a farmer, electrician, carpenter, physician, soldier, mother, scientist, or someone sweeping a hospital floor at three in the morning.

It is not a title. It is an achievement.

The Gods Inside the Human Head

But the problem goes much deeper than capitalism, industrialization, or even philosophy.

What interests me most about consciousness is that the supposedly unified self may never have been particularly unified.

We experience ourselves as singular individuals. We use the pronoun I. We imagine a continuous observer who makes decisions, commands the body, and maintains a coherent identity.

Yet one part of us wants to wake early while another wants to sleep. One part wants commitment while another seeks novelty. One part understands that a behavior is destructive while another repeats it. We experience intrusive thoughts, uninvited memories, dreams, sudden intuitions, and decisions whose causes become apparent only afterward.

Who, exactly, is speaking? And to whom?

In The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (1976), psychologist Julian Jaynes proposed an astonishing hypothesis: ancient human beings may have experienced a fundamentally different organization of mental life.

Rather than possessing modern reflective consciousness, they might have experienced certain internally generated instructions as auditory hallucinations originating from external authorities, interpreted as gods, ancestors, or supernatural beings.

Under this interpretation, divine commands in ancient literature were not necessarily merely metaphors or literary conventions. They might preserve traces of a different relationship between cognition and self-awareness.

When Athena intervenes in the affairs of a Greek hero, perhaps the hero is experiencing an internally generated instruction as the voice of a god.

Perhaps the divine was sometimes a form of cognition that human beings did not yet recognize as their own.

Jaynes's theory is controversial, and its historical and neurological claims remain unestablished. But I think it is extraordinarily valuable as a challenge to the assumption that the self is a single, transparent commander.

It is also wonderfully Fight Club-esque, although ordinary internal conflict should not be confused with the dissociative disorder depicted in that story.

We may be better understood as coalitions of biological priorities attempting to produce coherent action.

And this suggests a different interpretation of self-mastery.

Perhaps becoming a complete person does not mean discovering a perfectly pure original self hidden beneath social conditioning. Perhaps it means organizing competing elements of the organism into a coherent direction.

The warrior, merchant, priest, and laborer can be understood not merely as social categories, but as possibilities within one person.

The merchant calculates. The warrior acts. The priest asks why. The laborer performs the necessary repetition.

The philosopher attempts to understand them all.

A mature individual does not destroy these internal figures. He establishes an order between them. Calculation serves purpose, purpose directs action, action becomes habit, and habit produces character.

This is where Jaynes unexpectedly meets Nietzsche. The sovereignty of consciousness may be partly illusory, yet the cultivation of an integrated self remains one of consciousness's greatest achievements.

The goal is not necessarily to eliminate the plurality of the mind.

It is to make that plurality capable of acting as one.

Philosophy Cannot Lift the Stone

This is also where Aristotle becomes relevant.

In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that moral virtues develop through practice, much as craftsmanship develops through repetition. We become courageous through courageous actions and disciplined through disciplined conduct.

He criticizes people who retreat into philosophical argument without acting, comparing them to patients who attentively listen to their doctors while ignoring every prescribed treatment.

I find it almost ridiculous how contemporary this criticism sounds.

A person watches hundreds of hours of fitness content without developing physical fitness. He reads about discipline without establishing a routine, studies relationships without learning to speak honestly, discusses courage while systematically avoiding embarrassment, and analyzes the nature of productive work without ever making anything.

He possesses an enormous intellectual vocabulary for virtues absent from his behavior.

Knowledge about a virtue is not the same as possessing it.

This is my principal objection to philosophy when it becomes endless dialectics. Not that reasoning is worthless; reasoning is indispensable. The problem is the transformation of reasoning into a substitute for experience.

Endless criticism without creation. Analysis without commitment. Discussion of moral character without the production of character.

A philosophy that never changes one's conduct is in danger of becoming a decorative object.

At some point, the discussion must end. You approach the water, assess whether the conditions are safe, and enter.

The cold is not an argument. It is an experience.

This is the reconciliation between Aristotle's practical philosophy and Nietzsche's self-overcoming. The self is not merely understood; it is made. And the making occurs in the world.

Beauty, Evolution, and the Butterfly

Imagine a butterfly resting on a window. Its wings display delicate symmetry, intricate patterns, and colors that appear almost impossibly elaborate. A person approaches carefully, perhaps opening the window so it can escape.

Now imagine a cockroach crossing the same room.

Disgust. Revulsion. Perhaps an impulse to crush it.

Both organisms are products of the same evolutionary process, yet human perception assigns them profoundly different aesthetic values.

I think this small example reveals something important about human nature. Aesthetic judgments often precede conscious justification. We experience attraction before constructing its philosophy, aversion before explaining it, and beauty before learning its name.

Part of this is evolutionary. Human preferences are shaped by sensory processing, developmental experience, social learning, and adaptations related to health, contamination, familiarity, and reproduction.

Our instincts are not infallible. Disgust can be misplaced, and beauty does not establish moral worth. But the fact remains that we are not disembodied rational agents who consciously negotiate every attraction.

Faces matter. Bodies matter. Sexual attractiveness matters. Physical condition, grooming, movement, posture, voice, and vitality influence how people perceive one another.

A person can deny this verbally while responding to it behaviorally every day.

I am skeptical of any philosophy that treats physical beauty as an embarrassing social illusion. Beauty is a real variable in human existence, and it affects relationships, opportunities, attention, and desire.

But the butterfly and cockroach also reveal the limits of instinct.

The fact that an organism is aesthetically appealing does not make it morally superior. A beautiful body can contain a coward, a powerful man can be a tyrant, and an ordinary-looking individual can possess extraordinary courage and intelligence.

The deeper ambition, then, is not simply to become beautiful. It is to bring outer form and inner substance into closer alignment.

Strength without cruelty. Confidence without delusion. Sensuality without compulsion. Physical excellence without the destruction of health.

We should cultivate beauty because beauty enriches existence, but the cultivated individual must possess something beyond his appearance.

Nature gives us preferences. Character determines what we do with them.

And I think genuine excellence begins when aesthetic self-development ceases to be mere vanity and becomes part of a broader cultivation of competence, health, judgment, and character.

God, Flesh, and the Problem of Being

There is a strange temptation within modern physicalism to conclude that religious thought has nothing further to contribute to understanding humanity.

I think this is a mistake.

Christianity contains a theological proposition of extraordinary importance for a philosophy of embodiment. Its central mystery is not simply that God exists, but that God becomes flesh.

John 1:14 declares:

"And the Word was made flesh."

Within Christian theology, the divine does not simply observe physical reality from an inaccessible distance. It enters human vulnerability, experiences hunger, exhaustion, pain, dependence, and death.

Whatever one believes about the literal truth of the Incarnation, its philosophical implications are enormous. The material world is not merely something to escape. Embodied existence is capable of carrying sacred significance.

Irenaeus of Lyons expresses something remarkably compatible with this in Against Heresies, IV.20.7:

"For the glory of God is a living man."

In context, Irenaeus connects the fullness of human life with beholding God, not simply with biological vitality. Nevertheless, the statement presents an intriguing point of contact with Nietzsche.

The two thinkers disagree profoundly about the nature of divinity, but both can be read as resisting forms of spirituality that despise earthly existence.

For Nietzsche, humanity must overcome life-denying values and return meaning to the earth. For Irenaeus, embodied human life finds its fulfillment through participation in divine reality.

This is also why the Christian idea of theosis, participation in divine life, interests me.

If physicalism is ultimately correct, then consciousness, love, and moral aspiration emerge from physical organization. We cannot simply import theological mechanisms as established science.

But theosis still provides an extraordinary philosophical image of transformation.

What would it mean to become more godlike not through supernatural privilege, but through the disciplined expansion of wisdom, responsibility, creative power, and love?

Here, agape becomes essential.

Agape is not identical to romantic attraction, sexual desire, or sentimental approval. It is concern for the good of another, potentially extending beyond immediate convenience and reciprocity.

Strength makes protection possible. Intelligence makes understanding possible. Discipline makes reliability possible. Wealth makes generosity and independence possible.

But none of these determines its own purpose.

A beautiful, physically powerful, highly intelligent person can still be utterly destructive.

Power is not equivalent to goodness. Excellence must answer the question: excellence FOR WHAT?

And perhaps the greatest possible answer is the creation and preservation of life, knowledge, beauty, and flourishing beyond the individual self.

There is also the older metaphysical question of whether existence possesses an ultimate ground.

Alvin Plantinga's modal ontological argument, developed in The Nature of Necessity (1974), attempts to establish the existence of a maximally great, necessarily existing being through modal logic. The argument's conclusion follows under its modal assumptions if its crucial possibility premise is accepted. Whether that premise is justified remains controversial.

I don't regard this as an uncontested demonstration of God, but the underlying question remains genuinely extraordinary.

Why does anything exist at all? Why does the universe possess an intelligible structure? Why does physical reality permit consciousness to arise?

A physicalist may appeal to fundamental physics, emergence, or brute fact. A theist may regard the intelligibility of existence as evidence of a necessary divine ground.

Either way, our immediate condition remains unchanged.

We are embodied, vulnerable, and required to act.

Whether the ultimate origin of reality is divine or impersonal, our lives occur INSIDE reality, not outside it.

And the body is our means of participating.

Sisyphus Against the Demiurge

There is a particular kind of despair that emerges when intelligence confronts the universe without comforting illusions.

Nature is not organized around our happiness. Earthquakes do not distinguish between innocent and guilty people. Cancer does not evaluate character. The ocean does not reward virtue with favorable currents.

We are capable of appreciating beauty, creating civilizations, and contemplating eternity, yet an asteroid, pathogen, or environmental catastrophe could destroy everything we have accomplished.

An entire species capable of understanding the stars can be destroyed by forces that do not know the species exists.

It seems grotesquely disproportionate.

This is where I find the Gnostic image of the Demiurge useful, not necessarily as a literal cosmic being, but as a metaphor for the conditions confronting embodied existence.

Gravity, entropy, scarcity, aging, disease, competition, and death.

These forces are not malicious. But from the perspective of a conscious creature struggling to survive, they can feel almost adversarial.

We want permanence; the world gives us change. We want certainty; the world gives us incomplete information. We want justice; the world gives us consequences that frequently have nothing to do with justice.

Albert Camus understood this contradiction.

In The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), Camus explores the absurd: the confrontation between humanity's longing for meaning and a world that does not provide the answers we demand.

Sisyphus is condemned to push a stone up a mountain. Every time he approaches the summit, the stone falls. His effort produces no permanent victory.

Yet Camus refuses to conclude that the absence of final success renders the struggle worthless.

"One must imagine Sisyphus happy."

This is one of the greatest philosophical images of the human condition ever produced.

Every human life is a temporary victory against entropy. We eat because the organism would otherwise deteriorate, exercise because unused capacities decline, repair buildings because time wears them down, maintain relationships because neglect destroys them, and educate children because knowledge is not transmitted automatically.

Everything requires maintenance.

There is no permanent summit.

The stone always returns.

But that does not invalidate the climb. It makes the climb the substance of life.

Here Nietzsche, Mishima, and Camus meet, despite their enormous disagreements. Human existence should not be organized entirely around avoiding pain, difficulty, and mortality.

Love exposes us to loss. Ambition exposes us to failure. Physical excellence exposes us to injury and limitation. Creation exposes us to judgment. Responsibility exposes us to consequences.

Every serious commitment creates vulnerability.

But suffering itself is not a virtue. Pointless injury and premature death prove nothing. Pain becomes meaningful when it serves a worthwhile purpose or cannot be avoided without abandoning something more important.

This is why I am more interested in the warrior who continues living than the warrior who glorifies dying.

Mishima's aesthetic of honorable death has a certain tragic power, but the ability to endure the monotony of responsibility may demand more courage than a single dramatic gesture.

The tired warrior is not impressive because he is approaching death. He is impressive because he has encountered resistance and continued.

The stone must be pushed again tomorrow.

And tomorrow, one pushes.

Who Actually Keeps the Lights On?

Most people have remarkably little direct experience of the systems keeping them alive.

They do not grow their food, purify their water, generate electricity, manufacture their clothing, or construct the buildings in which they sleep. They depend upon a vast network of specialized labor while experiencing themselves as largely autonomous.

The system works so well that it becomes invisible.

Until it fails.

Then the hierarchy of importance changes immediately. The electrician becomes indispensable. The mechanic matters. The farmer matters. The nurse matters. The person capable of restoring the physical system suddenly possesses an obvious value that no amount of marketing is required to demonstrate.

I don't think this makes intellectual or administrative work worthless. Engineering, scientific research, logistics, medicine, and complex coordination are indispensable to modern civilization.

But there is an enormous distinction between work that produces real value and work that merely imitates usefulness.

David Graeber explored this distinction in Bullshit Jobs: A Theory (2018), examining employment that workers themselves perceive as socially pointless or unnecessary.

The precise prevalence of such work is disputed, but I find the underlying phenomenon difficult to dismiss. Modern organizations can become elaborate systems of administrative self-reproduction, in which reporting, compliance theater, managerial signaling, and the appearance of productivity gradually displace productive activity itself.

Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition (1958) provides a useful philosophical distinction between labor, work, and action. Labor sustains biological life, work constructs a durable human world, and action reveals human initiative within public life.

Her framework helps explain why economic productivity alone cannot serve as a complete measure of civilizational health.

A society can become extraordinarily productive while making its members feel unnecessary. It can increase convenience while decreasing competence. It can create unprecedented communication infrastructure while leaving people isolated.

It can make us richer in possessions and poorer in experiences of agency.

Simone Weil, whose experience of factory labor profoundly influenced her philosophy, understood the seriousness of necessity. Manual labor can be exhausting, monotonous, humiliating, and dangerous, but it also places the human being in direct confrontation with the material conditions of existence.

I think the important response is neither to romanticize workers nor to treat physical labor as inferior.

The skilled electrician thinks through his hands. The carpenter possesses geometric intuitions expressed through measurement and touch. The farmer understands ecological relationships that cannot be reduced to inspirational slogans about nature.

The highest ideal is not someone who rejects intellectual life for manual labor.

It is someone whose intelligence remains connected to consequences.

Someone who can think and act, understand and build, contemplate civilization and participate in maintaining it.

We should stop treating practical competence as something vaguely beneath the educated classes.

A person who understands the metaphysics of human agency but cannot perform a single useful action in the physical world has an incomplete education.

Nick Land, AI, and the Religion of the Future

Every civilization seems to possess a story about salvation.

Sometimes salvation comes through divine revelation, sometimes political revolution, sometimes national rebirth, and sometimes the accumulation of wealth.

Modern technological civilization increasingly tells a different story: salvation will come through the next invention.

The next artificial intelligence system. The next biotechnology breakthrough. The next expansion of automation. The next attempt to colonize another planet. The next step beyond the limitations of human biology.

Nick Land is especially interesting here because he takes the logic of technological acceleration far beyond the usual optimistic language of progress.

In his essay Meltdown (1994), later collected in Fanged Noumena (2011), Land imagines capital, computation, and technological development converging into a process that increasingly exceeds deliberate human control.

His striking formulation is:

"Nothing human makes it out of the near-future."

I think this is one of the most chilling sentences in modern philosophy.

Not necessarily because it is a reliable prediction, but because it reveals the logical endpoint of treating technological acceleration as an autonomous historical force.

For Land, particularly in his earlier accelerationist writing, capitalism is not merely an economic system operated by human beings. It increasingly resembles an impersonal process of machinic development, one that uses human institutions and desires as components of its own expansion.

Fisher and Land are useful precisely because their interpretations differ.

Fisher investigates the psychological and cultural enclosure of life within capitalist realism. Land explores the possibility that capital and technology are escaping the very human purposes that supposedly justified their development.

Put together, they suggest an uncomfortable question.

What happens when the systems originally developed to improve human life acquire trajectories increasingly disconnected from human flourishing?

The irony is that people may become fascinated with artificial superintelligence while allowing their own intelligence to deteriorate through passivity. They dream of radically extended lifespans while neglecting the health of the bodies they already possess. They imagine colonies on Mars while never exploring the forests surrounding their homes.

They anticipate future abundance while remaining incapable of enjoying an ordinary afternoon.

Technology becomes a secular eschatology. Paradise is always arriving with the next update, and the present becomes a waiting room.

Even speculative thought experiments like Roko's Basilisk are revealing. They transform hypothetical future intelligence into an object of present anxiety, almost a technologically reconstructed deity capable of making demands across imagined timelines.

The old gods return wearing the language of computation.

I am not arguing against technological development. Scientific progress has reduced suffering, expanded knowledge, and saved countless lives. I would rather live with modern medicine, sanitation, electricity, and reliable infrastructure than without them.

Nor do I think humanity should abandon its ambitions to explore space.

But I question the assumption that the future automatically deserves priority over the present.

We may eventually create machines capable of extraordinary intelligence. We may discover radically new forms of cognition. We may settle other planets or transform human biology.

None of this requires us to sacrifice the immediate goods of being human to some imagined technological destiny.

The sunrise does not become worthless because someone might someday build an artificial sun. Human intimacy does not become obsolete because a machine may simulate affection. The forest does not lose its meaning because a virtual environment can reproduce its appearance.

The future deserves preparation.

It does not deserve worship.

A Return to the Physical World

What does a genuinely embodied philosophy look like in practice? What does the perfect man look like, the aristocrat of the soul, the man who has reconciled intellect with instinct, beauty with strength, spirit with flesh?

He is not some pale intellectual rotting behind a desk, theorizing about existence while other men actually live it before his very eyes. Nor is he the modern consumer, purchasing the appearance of masculinity through expensive watches, fashionable clothing, and equipment he will never use. He is a man of ACTION, of physical and intellectual sovereignty, whose body is not an accessory to his consciousness, but its greatest expression. He rises early, before the machinery of modern civilization has begun demanding his attention, before the algorithms and advertisements can reach into his skull and colonize his thoughts. He drinks cold spring water, throws open the windows, and walks into the morning sunlight. The air is cool against his bare skin. The earth is damp beneath his feet. His lungs fill with oxygen, his muscles awaken, and somewhere in the trees the birds are screaming their ancient songs into the morning. His life is optimized now. He has embodied the theory of action.

He does not reach for his phone. He does not require a podcast to accompany his thoughts or some miserable productivity guru to explain why waking up is worthwhile. He already knows. The sun is rising. The world is alive. And so is he. The entire physical universe lies before him, indifferent, magnificent, inexhaustible, waiting to be touched, explored, conquered, understood, and loved.

He RUNS. Not the pathetic shuffle of a man reluctantly completing his prescribed daily exercise, but the running of a wild animal that has remembered what its legs are for. He charges through forests, over hills, across open fields, his heart hammering against his ribs, his lungs burning, his quadriceps and calves driving him forward. He sprints until the wind tears through his hair and sweat runs down his back. He runs through summer rain, through mud, through cold mornings when the air bites his face. He climbs mountains, grips stone with his bare hands, scrambles over fallen trees, and stands on ridgelines overlooking valleys that existed millions of years before his ancestors learned to speak. He dives into cold rivers, swims against currents, and breaks the surface gasping for air, laughing at the sheer physical violence and inexplainable hardship of being alive. He rows until his shoulders ache, kayaks across lakes at sunrise, cycles for miles beneath the open sky, wrestles, boxes, jumps, throws, carries, and lifts. 

He puts heavy iron above his head and feels the entire chain of muscle, tendon, and bone cooperate against gravity. He practices archery until the bow becomes an extension of his nervous system, learns marksmanship and the discipline of handling a firearm, goes hunting, tracks animals through woodland, and understands that food and survival were once inseparable from patience, precision, and physical competence.

He knows the weight of a hammer, the recoil of a rifle, the resistance of water against an oar, the brutality of a steep climb, and the extraordinary satisfaction of returning home physically exhausted. His body is not merely attractive. It is USEFUL. His strength is real, his endurance earned, his movements coordinated and deliberate. He is beautiful in the ancient Greek sense of kalokagathia, in which physical excellence and nobility of character form a single human ideal. He has made himself into something worthy of admiration because he has made himself capable of doing things worth admiring.

He eats like a man who understands that his body is constructed from the physical world. There is no ridiculous war against carbohydrates, no obsessive fear of fruit, no endless procession of processed powders promising some miraculous biological transformation.

He eats Greek yogurt thick with honey, blueberries, strawberries, raspberries, cold peaches, oranges, figs, and grapes. He eats eggs, fish, beef, chicken, beans, lentils, potatoes, rice, bread, oats, pasta, avocados, vegetables drenched in olive oil, and whatever fresh food the season provides. His diet is Mediterranean in its abundance, simple in its composition, and generous enough to sustain the tremendous energy he demands from his organism. He drinks cold water after running beneath the afternoon sun, feels hunger sharpen the pleasure of eating, and understands that nutrition is not an abstract system of moral prohibitions, but the ancient biological transaction through which the living world sustains itself. Food is sunlight converted into chemistry, chemistry converted into muscle, and muscle converted into action. The fruit grew from the earth. The fish came from the sea. The grain was planted, harvested, milled, and baked by human hands. He respects the extraordinary material chain connecting his existence to the rest of nature. He eats with appetite, without guilt or theatrical self-denial.

He keeps himself lean, strong, energetic, sexually vigorous, and metabolically healthy. He understands that a capable body is not produced by wishing, purchasing, or philosophizing, but through years of movement, nourishment, recovery, and discipline. The organism rewards what is repeatedly practiced. He practices excellence.

And he LOVES. Christ, how he loves. He is not an ascetic fleeing into abstractions because he is frightened of the animal force of his own desires. He understands that sexuality is among the most powerful expressions of embodied human existence, that erotic attraction is not some vulgar embarrassment to be transcended, but an ancient biological intelligence older than philosophy, religion, and civilization itself. He desires beautiful women, admires their faces, their bodies, their movement, their voices, their scent, the astonishing physical difference between masculine and feminine forms. He cultivates his own appearance with the same seriousness he brings to every other dimension of life: muscle, grooming, clean skin, healthy hair, good teeth, elegant clothing, confident posture, and the relaxed physical presence of a man at home in his own body. He flirts without shame, kisses with passion, makes love with a woman who desires him just as fiercely, and understands the extraordinary pleasure of two conscious organisms voluntarily surrendering themselves to physical intimacy. Sex beneath the stars, kisses in summer rain, bare feet in the grass, bodies pressed together after swimming in a lake, laughter beneath tangled sheets while the morning light enters the bedroom. There is nothing metaphysically trivial about this. The warmth of another body, the force of attraction, the intimacy of touch, the ridiculous happiness of being wanted by someone you want in return: these are among the most astonishing phenomena the physical universe has to offer.

He neither sterilizes sexuality into clinical terminology nor reduces it to conquest and numerical achievement. He understands eros as a celebration of vitality, and love as the decision to make another person's existence profoundly important to his own. He is passionate, affectionate, loyal, confident, and unashamed of his true embodied nature. He wants to live, to love, to have sex, to experience the entire magnificent range of what a healthy human body can feel. He has no interest in becoming a disembodied consciousness floating through some sterile technological paradise. He has flesh, blood, nerves, desire, and a beating heart. He intends to USE THEM.

But the aristocrat is not merely an athlete or a lover. He is a WORKER, a builder, a maker, a man whose hands are connected to his intelligence. He can repair a broken machine, swing an axe, build a fence, cook a substantial meal, navigate unfamiliar terrain, maintain his home, carry heavy furniture, and help another person without first searching for someone to pay. He respects farmers, electricians, construction workers, carpenters, plumbers, mechanics, and the millions of people whose physical competence keeps civilization from collapsing into darkness and sewage. He knows that the comfortable existence of the intellectual and the consumer depends upon men who understand the material world well enough to make it function. He despises pointless bureaucracy, corporate theater, and the endless proliferation of occupations whose primary product is the appearance of importance. He does not necessarily abandon modern employment, because money is a real resource and economic independence is a condition of freedom. But he refuses to confuse his salary with his worth, his job title with his identity, or the demands of an employer with the purpose of his existence. He reads Nietzsche, Aristotle, Camus, Mishima, yes, but also the great works of science and history. He studies physics, evolution, theology, engineering, politics, the ancient languages like Greek and Latin, and the extraordinary intellectual inheritance of humanity.

Yet he does not mistake the consumption of knowledge for its application.

His reading makes him more capable of understanding the world, and his actions expose his understanding to the judgment of reality. He can discuss metaphysics in the morning and repair a roof in the afternoon. He can appreciate a symphony, but also appreciate the engineering of a bridge. He is not divided between the intellectual and the physical. His intelligence operates through his entire organism. He does not merely KNOW things. He can DO things.

And when evening comes, when the work is finished and his muscles carry the satisfying heaviness of a day actually lived, he goes outside once more. Perhaps he sits beside a lake, perhaps he walks through a field, perhaps he lies in the grass with the woman he loves, her head resting against his chest while the sky turns orange and violet.

The sun descends toward the horizon, that enormous nuclear furnace burning approximately 150 million kilometers away, illuminating a planet covered in oceans, forests, mountains, and billions of extraordinary living organisms. Or at least, supposedly so. He wouldn't know.

But he does know. He knows perfectly well what the sun is. He understands something of nuclear fusion, stellar evolution, electromagnetic radiation, and the atmospheric scattering that produces the colors before him. He has seen it himself.

He knows that the Earth is not the mathematical center of the universe, that humanity is technically an evolutionary accident in no privileged cosmic position, and that his own existence is an almost absurdly brief event in the history of matter. Yet this knowledge does not diminish the experience. IT MAKES IT GREATER YET!!

There is something almost unbearably beautiful about the fact that an animal made of carbon, water, minerals, and electrical activity can sit on a small planet and understand the star that keeps him alive. He does not need to invent supernatural explanations to make the sunset sacred. The physical explanation is already astonishing enough. Reality is stranger than fiction, after all. He listens to the wind moving through the trees, feels the cooling air against his skin once more, tastes the sweetness of cold fruit, and watches the daylight disappear. He knows that one day he will die, that the muscles he built will decay, that his face will disappear, and that the universe will continue without consulting him. His memories will vanish. But he does not spend the evening trembling before this fact. He has lived today. He has run, lifted, worked, learned, eaten, laughed, loved, and placed himself in direct contact with the extraordinary world into which he was born. He has not merely observed existence. He has PARTICIPATED in it. The man is content.

This is the aristocrat of the soul. Not a hereditary nobleman, not a corporate executive dressed as a warrior, not a vain narcissist worshipping his reflection, and certainly not a comfortable intellectual endlessly discussing the possibility of an authentic life while refusing to live one. He is the integrated human being, the man in whom the priest, warrior, merchant, laborer, philosopher, athlete, and lover have found their proper order.

He possesses the warrior's courage, the priest's reverence, the philosopher's curiosity, the craftsman's competence, the athlete's physical discipline, and the lover's lust for life.

He understands the modern world without allowing it to consume him. He uses technology without becoming its servant, earns money without worshipping it, cultivates beauty without reducing existence to appearances, and studies philosophy without hiding inside of it as a means of escapism. He is not waiting for artificial intelligence, immortality, colonization of Mars, or the arrival of some magnificent future civilization to make his present existence worthwhile. He is not postponing life until he becomes rich enough, handsome enough, intelligent enough, or powerful enough to deserve it. He understands something the modern world has almost completely forgotten: LIFE IS NOT A PREPARATORY EXERCISE. It is the event, in of itself. Close and shut case.

The body is not an inconvenience to be transcended, the earth is not an obsolete platform awaiting technological replacement, and the physical universe is not an inferior imitation of some higher reality. This is the world. These are our hands. This is our blood, our breath, our sunlight, our flesh, our ridiculous and magnificent little interval between birth and oblivion. We have been given the astonishing privilege of being conscious matter, capable of shaping itself and participating in the world that produced it, capable of suffering, capable of being in pain, capable of prevailing. The aristocrat does not waste that privilege. He goes into the world and takes hold of it. He runs through fields like a fourteen-year-old boy, swims through cold water, climbs until his legs burn, makes love, builds things, discovers things, and returns home beneath the stars exhausted and extraordinarily glad to be alive. And tomorrow, if fortune permits, he will do it all again. And again. And again. Forever. And him and death will never cross paths, for he is immortal, the sensitive young man.

Eros and the Human Animal

We are not merely organisms designed to survive.

We are sexual and social organisms, whose emotional systems evolved in relation to other organisms.

There is something remarkable about romantic attraction. Among billions of people, one particular person becomes unusually significant. Their arrival changes the atmosphere of a room. Their absence makes ordinary spaces feel incomplete. Their touch changes the nervous system.

Physical attraction is often the beginning.

A body communicates health, sexual maturity, movement, vitality, expression, and countless characteristics that influence our desires, frequently before conscious reflection.

But enduring intimacy requires much more.

Desire brings people together. Character determines much of what happens afterward.

This is why physical self-improvement, although genuinely valuable, cannot become a complete theory of romantic fulfillment.

A person may become extraordinarily attractive and remain incapable of trust. He may be strong but unreliable, desirable but disloyal, socially successful but unable to sustain genuine closeness.

The distinction between eros and agape becomes useful here.

Eros says: I want you.

Agape asks: What is good for you?

A mature relationship requires some reconciliation of these impulses. Desire without care becomes consumption. Care without desire may remain affectionate companionship but lack romantic vitality.

When attraction, affection, loyalty, and responsibility reinforce one another, two vulnerable organisms create a shared world.

They become witnesses to each other's lives.

And perhaps that is one of the most profound responses to mortality available to us.

We cannot guarantee eternity, but we can make our temporary existence matter deeply to another temporary being.

Two lovers beneath the stars do not need a cosmic audience. Their bodies will age, their memories will eventually disappear, and the universe will continue.

Yet the moment is real.

Its finitude does not subtract from its significance. It may be precisely what makes it so valuable.

The Seventeen-Year-Old Running Through the Trees

There is a particular kind of memory that seems to contain an entire philosophy of existence.

A summer afternoon. The air is warm. The day feels impossibly long. You are young enough that the future remains an abstraction rather than a series of approaching obligations.

You are outside, perhaps running through a forest, swimming in a lake, or riding a bicycle toward a destination that does not matter.

You are not optimizing longevity, studying consciousness, calculating socioeconomic position, measuring your attractiveness against strangers, or constructing a coherent ideological identity.

You are simply alive.

Your body and the world are engaged in the same event. You move because movement feels good, laugh because something is funny, become tired and hungry and thirsty. The sun begins to set, someone calls you home, and the day ends.

Perhaps years later you remember the moment with an almost unbearable tenderness.

Why?

Not necessarily because you were happier. You may have been insecure, confused, frightened, or socially awkward.

I think it is because your experience of existence had not yet been completely subordinated to its instrumental value.

The afternoon was not a means of achieving something else.

It WAS the thing itself.

You did not need the forest to improve productivity, swimming to optimize cardiovascular biomarkers, friendship to expand social capital, or the sunset to regulate your circadian rhythm.

These benefits may have existed, but they were not the reason you participated.

You participated because you were alive and the world was there.

This is what adulthood so easily destroys.

Every activity becomes a means. Exercise improves appearance. Appearance increases status. Status acquires attention. Attention creates opportunity. Opportunity produces wealth. Wealth purchases freedom.

Freedom becomes the distant promise that someday, finally, we may begin living.

And so life is postponed indefinitely.

A person may spend forty years constructing the conditions under which he intends to begin existing. He becomes extraordinarily successful at arranging his life while remaining strangely absent from it.

The tragedy is not ambition. Ambition can be magnificent.

The tragedy is forgetting the distinction between the infrastructure of life and life itself.

Money is useful because it supports freedom, security, experience, and responsibility. Fitness matters because it expands physical capacity and protects health. Beauty matters because it enriches experience and influences relationships. Technology matters because it extends what we can know and accomplish.

But none of these means should consume the ends they are intended to serve.

And this is where I think much of contemporary self-improvement goes wrong.

A person can become so obsessed with becoming excellent that he loses the capacity to enjoy the excellence he achieves.

The body becomes a project. Beauty becomes a score. Sex becomes an achievement. Nature becomes a wellness intervention. Every sunrise becomes an optimization technique.

Even the rebellion against modern abstraction becomes another abstraction.

Fisher's capitalist realism returns in miniature: the individual begins managing his own existence as though it were a business.

The person who cannot enjoy an ordinary day because he is preoccupied with becoming a superior version of himself has misunderstood the purpose of improvement.

We cultivate the body so that we can live more fully inside it, not so that cultivating the body becomes an endless substitute for living.

The seventeen-year-old running through the trees is not necessarily ignorant of life's meaning.

Perhaps, for that afternoon, he is experiencing it.

The Last Human Summer

Suppose humanity really is approaching a civilizational threshold.

Suppose artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, and technological development eventually transform the conditions of existence beyond recognition.

Perhaps our descendants will possess capacities we would regard as superhuman. Perhaps they will merge increasingly with machines. Perhaps artificial intelligence will become one of civilization's principal participants.

Perhaps none of these predictions will materialize in the form their advocates expect.

We do not know.

But consider the possibility that the familiar human condition—biological birth, childhood, adolescence, courtship, labor, parenthood, aging, and death—will not remain the dominant form of intelligent existence forever.

What would we owe to it?

Not because humanity is perfect. It isn't. Far from it.

Our bodies are vulnerable, our minds are biased, and evolution has produced extraordinary capacities alongside enormous suffering. There is nothing sacred about preventable disease or ignorance merely because they are natural.

If technology can reduce suffering, cure illnesses, and expand human freedom, we have excellent reasons to develop it.

But there is also something irreplaceable about the texture of physical human existence.

A machine may someday simulate the experience of climbing a mountain with extraordinary fidelity, but the actual mountain remains an encounter between an organism and a world independent of its wishes.

A virtual forest may reproduce every visual detail of the trees, but the real forest exists within a biological community older than civilization.

A synthetic companion may produce convincing affection, but a relationship between two independent people contains the remarkable fact that neither consciousness is under the other's complete control.

These are encounters with things that exceed us.

And I think that matters.

The greatest possible human ideal is not simply conquest, domination, intelligence, strength, or beauty.

It is consensual, full, unrelenting participation.

To belong consciously to the world that produced us. To cultivate our capacities, recognize our limitations, create beauty, protect those who depend upon us, contribute something durable, and love other human beings while they are still here.

Nietzsche teaches the affirmation of embodied existence and the necessity of self-overcoming. Mishima teaches that words must eventually become flesh. Evola, stripped of his authoritarian mythology, raises the question of what happens when economic calculation supplants courage, sacred purpose, and inner sovereignty.

Jaynes reveals the strange possibility that the unified self is an achievement rather than a starting condition. Aristotle reminds us that character is made through action. Christianity's Incarnation and theosis offer images of the sacred significance of embodied life and the transformation of human capacities toward something higher.

Camus reminds us that the certainty of death and the absence of final victory do not invalidate the struggle.

Fisher shows how capitalism can colonize even our imagined alternatives. Land offers the terrifying possibility of technological acceleration escaping the human purposes that originally justified it.

And Arendt and Weil remind us that existence depends not merely upon thinking, consuming, and desiring, but upon work, necessity, and participation in a shared material world.

These thinkers do not agree with one another. Their metaphysics, politics, and moral conclusions often conflict, sometimes irreconcilably.

But I think their most useful insights can be brought together into something like an embodied existential humanism.

Its central claim is that human life becomes most meaningful when developed capacities are brought into sustained, conscious contact with reality.

Thought serves understanding. Understanding informs action. Action develops character. Character directs strength. Strength protects and creates. Beauty deepens appreciation. Love gives these capacities purposes beyond the self.

And all of them must ultimately serve life rather than replace it.

The final purpose of human excellence is not to become so superior that one no longer belongs to humanity.

It is to become a more complete participant in the human condition.

While We Still Are

One day, the last person who remembers you will die.

The buildings you knew will be demolished or rebuilt. The roads you traveled will change. The names of familiar places will disappear, photographs will deteriorate, and the people you loved will have their own final afternoons.

Eventually, perhaps, the civilization that produced your life will become unrecognizable.

Further into the future, even the mountains will change. The continents will move, the oceans will transform, and the Sun itself will not remain as it is forever.

Nothing in our familiar world possesses an unconditional guarantee of permanence.

It would be easy to regard this as a reason for despair.

But I think impermanence makes the opposite demand.

Perhaps we should stop confusing duration with significance.

A flower does not need to bloom forever to have been beautiful. A song does not need to continue indefinitely to have been worth hearing. A friendship is not rendered meaningless by the eventual death of both friends, and a life does not become worthless simply because it ends.

For one brief interval in the history of matter, we are permitted to open our eyes.

We can walk beneath trees, feel water moving around our bodies, build homes, repair machines, study the stars, make love, raise children, grow old beside someone, plant orchards whose fruit we may never eat, and discover things no previous human being has known.

We can defend people who cannot defend themselves. We can make mistakes, recognize them, and change. We can become stronger, wiser, more capable of understanding and participating in existence.

And then, eventually, we cannot.

That is the condition.

Not necessarily an injustice, not necessarily a humiliation, and not a reason to despise existence.

Perhaps there is a God beyond it. Perhaps consciousness participates in realities we have not understood. Perhaps the final nature of the universe is stranger than physicalism, theology, or any existing metaphysical system can describe.

But none of these questions needs to be settled before we begin living seriously.

The earth is beneath us. The sun is above us. The organism is alive.

There is work to do, people to love, food to grow, water to protect, shelter to build, knowledge to acquire, and beauty to create.

There are mountains we have not climbed, oceans in which we have not swum, conversations we have not had, and capacities in ourselves that have never been tested.

And somewhere there is a seventeen-year-old running through the trees without knowing that one day he will remember this afternoon as something sacred.

Perhaps the greatest act of philosophical courage is realizing that the boy was not ignorant of life's meaning.

He was experiencing it.

He did not need a completed metaphysical system, the assurance of immortality, or proof that his existence would matter to the universe.

He was alive, and for that moment, being alive was enough.

I don't think we should abandon our intelligence to recover his freedom. I think we should use our intelligence to understand why his freedom mattered, then construct lives capable of making room for it.

The future may be extraordinary. It may also be terrifying. Perhaps we will create intelligences greater than ourselves, settle other worlds, or transform into something that can no longer recognize the species from which it emerged.

Let the future arrive when it arrives.

But do not offer it every remaining hour of the present.

Do not become so fascinated with transcending humanity that you fail to experience being human. Do not spend your entire life studying courage, beauty, strength, love, nature, and existence while forgetting to participate in them.

Go outside. Feel the weather! Become strong enough to carry something, learn enough to make something, care enough to protect something, and love someone without treating them as a possession.

Spend your intelligence on reality.

Let the body discover what the mind has spent so long trying to explain.

And when the world refuses to yield, when the stone falls, when the future becomes uncertain and the universe offers no assurance that your efforts will endure, remember the only victory entirely available to a mortal creature:

To have participated fully. To have been here. To have seen the light and answered it with a life.

We can build the machines tomorrow. We can contemplate the stars tonight.

But the trees are outside now. The water is cold now. The sun is rising now.

And we are still human.

Let's go be human for a little while longer. Let's go be physical. Let's go be seventeen-year-olds running through the trees.

Let's go be alive, while we still can, and while we still are.

Saturday, January 31, 2026

Misconceptions in American Politics

I must apologize in advance for my reluctance to write recently. A lot of my 'professional' work (that is, content produced to be considered and thought about, such as books, novels, essay at cetera) has been centered on fiction rather than participating in political discourse, simply because I deem the latter quite pointless. However, with the current state of affairs in both the United States and the United Kingdom, two countries where I have resided, pointing to:

  • a bleak reality where the consumer is so immersed in a process of Fisherian 'Capitalist Realism' that he himself becomes the product of giant companies that sell one's data back to them
  • a situation where inflation (particularly of the US dollar) has become completely normalized, and the Federal Reserve does not seem to matter
  • it becomes illegal to criticize things being done by elected representatives upon both your class and demographic
  • it is completely normal for government appointees and public servants to be participating in backroom deals and backhanded business dealings against the common good of the working class
  • an omnipresent surveillance state using credit systems, face detection, fake image and video generation, health data and credit tracking along with a social credit system is in the works, and currently the newest obsession of government-economic monopolies around the world, seeking an arms race on how to 'outrace' one another on its development
  • businesses are aggressively seeking to utilize technology involving brain implants to their advantages, in order to commercialize it like they did artificial intelligence tools
  • and most of all, the value of human art becomes meaningless by comparison

...it becomes quite necessary to cover the topic.

My second apology is issued in advance to a very specific demographic. It is not those called out in this article explicitly, because I hope you are offended. It has always been my pleasure as a writer to incite and thoroughly encourage a reaction in my readers. But instead, it is issued to those who do not read well enough to understand what I say. You are blameless, and your brain has been fried by the digital bread and circuses of our age, of which I am guilty in participating in and propagating.

Like all good systems of capitalist 'innovation', you reinforce and feed into it regardless of whether you consent to participate, and whatever you make will be recycled by an automated system at some point in the future into consumable content-slop. It is only fair that you keep an eye out for it as well. Social media is a survival mechanism, and I'd hate to deprive you of the many interesting Instagram reels you may see today. It makes no sense to me to separate oneself from society and live in a hut in the forest if one has to pay taxes to a government that propagates itself and its systems upon future generations regardless of your niche political outlooks. Unless you're going for complete, outlaw-like, celibate isolation, at which point you risk doing mental harm to yourself and going crazy. One can only be Huxley's 'John the Savage' for so long.

I want to elaborate on all of the modern 'symptoms of the time' I mentioned in my bullet list above, and more specifically, how they apply in the United States, rather than the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whose laws are a subject for another time (albeit I trust that Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor won't be of much help, seeing the recent events unfold). The most specific symptom of modernity I wish to embark upon explaining is the core misconception in American politics revealed when ordinary people discuss ICE and Donald J. Trump's deportation measures. Although I was never a Trump loyalist by any means, nor am I devoutly critical of the man, putting myself in the position of an 'astute observer' of the chaos.

I take this position as preferable, and would rather it than an attitude such as that of Sliwa's 'loyal opposition' approach towards the Democratic Party, for instance, or Alexandria-Ocasio Cortez's progressivist and rather non-conciliatory approach towards the Republicans, and particularly the MAGA Republicans, in of themselves, not because I don't think their ideas are worth exploring and extracting sense from, but because I see how alienating they may be to some Americans, who do not explore the political landscape dynamically, and merely rely on simple buzz-words and catchphrases (if this were a video, you'd see Biden's 'when we finally beat, uh, medi-care' gaff here, or anything George W. Bush has ever said in public, particularly while having a nice time golfing).

As an 'astute observer of the chaos', I must point out the obvious in the ICE discourse. The left and the right are confused among themselves. Why would it be the left, particularly the socialist and progressive left, out of all groups that could mistakenly ally themselves, that would be on the side of protecting due process for illegal immigrants? Every single socialist and progressive movement throughout recent modern history has been protectionist and isolationist. And indeed, up until the era of Donald J. Trump's 'Make America Great Again Movement', a movement that has notably failed to reduce the price of eggs or build any sort of wall that Mexico would theoretically pay for, it was considered ludicrous for a so-called 'conservative' or a 'nationalist' to be firstly secular, and secondly isolationist and deeply protectionist. Yet, Donald has become the 'visage' upon which the needs and beliefs of the American public are reflected. He has cemented himself, by sheer will, egoism and arrogance alone, as a national symbol, and even a controversial (yet seemingly beloved by some) topic of Thanksgiving table discussion.

Yet compare this to the German left's approach of seeking benefits for German-born workers rather than immigrant ones, or the efforts of the Conservative Party of Canada (and up until recently, the United Kingdom) to attract cheap labor to boost medium and big business by bringing in immigrants. Compare it to the policies of the broadly nationalist and left-wing governments of Southeast Asia and Central Europe that have halted illegal immigration in all forms primarily through labor-aligned and economic policy. Compare these seemingly uncontroversial approaches of the left around the world for protecting domestic workers with the socialist-progressive movement (and the broader left-liberal movement) within the Democratic Party and the United States, and you will see that the vast majority of anti-crackdown efforts and protests against organizations like ICE carry a similar sentiment to the Pro-Palestinian campus protests of our year 2024/25. Rather than confronting the core issue, it is the humanitarian root toward the center of the issue that is being explicitly focused on.

The Gazan refugees of yesteryear's upset become the Guatemalan refugees of today's most ferocious argument. The problem remains the same - unchanging, unchallenged, with no possible diplomatic or political solution to reach a compromise that could work for the country in question, or the world and the United Nations at large. I by no means claim to be a prophet when I claim now, towards the end of January, the first month of the new year, that no compromise will be reached regarding the mass, sometimes legally void, deportations being pursued by ICE under the second Trump administration, as well as the Democrat calls against Attorney-General Pam Bondi, and speaker-of-the-house Mike Johnson, among other prominent Republican politicians, in relation to it.

The immigration crisis in America becomes not a thorough understanding of immigrants and the injustices they face under U.S. law, but just another push issue to fight about, disguising the ongoing debate about DJT's (the President's) morality as some other matter of our period, in order to continue the relentless assaults over civil matters between the left and the right without a legislative compromise or even a diplomatic approach, resulting in an ongoing government stalemate that seems to reoccur in a shutdown every so often.

Let me embark upon my previous list now, and demonstrate how these societal symptoms tie together with the brawling currently going on around America's streets (over the proposed establishment of a police state, that has actually already been in force for over a century, unbeknownst to said protesters):

  1. The common thread tying these symptoms together is not ideology but infrastructure. Each phenomenon is treated in public discourse as a moral aberration, a failure of character, or the excesses of a particular party, when in fact they are structural outcomes of systems that reward scale, abstraction, and depersonalization. Capitalist realism is not merely a cultural mood, but a practical constraint. When every social relation is mediated through markets, metrics, and platforms, the individual ceases to be a citizen or even a worker in the classical sense, and becomes instead a simple, exploited, and extremely sedated and spiritually meaningless data-producing node. The illusion of choice remains intact, yet the very range of outcomes narrows. You may choose what to consume, but you may not choose to stop being consumed. This is why resistance so often takes the form of symbolic outrage rather than material change. The system does not require your belief, only your participation.
  2. Inflation’s normalization follows naturally from this abstraction. Currency, like labor, has been severed from tangible reference points. The dollar inflates not only because of monetary policy, but because it no longer represents a social contract grounded in production and reciprocity. It represents confidence in continuity. The Federal Reserve appears irrelevant not because it lacks power, but because its power is exercised in a closed loop that no longer meaningfully interfaces with ordinary life. Wages lag, assets soar, and the explanation is endlessly technical, shielding responsibility behind complexity. When inflation becomes background noise, so too does economic precarity. People adapt, not because conditions improve, but because instability is framed as normal adulthood.
  3. From this follows the criminalization of criticism. When systems cannot justify themselves materially, they resort to procedural legitimacy and moral language. Dissent is not argued against but reclassified. It becomes misinformation, extremism, or social harm. This is not the abolition of free speech in the theatrical sense, but its containment. You may speak, but only within boundaries that do not threaten the reproduction of the system itself. Class critique becomes hate. Demographic analysis becomes discrimination. The language shifts just enough to preserve the appearance of liberal norms while hollowing out their substance.
  4. Corruption, then, is not a deviation, but instead an expected behavior. When governance is treated as a managerial function rather than a public trust, backroom dealings are simply the most efficient means of coordination between aligned interests. They become good. They become ideal. The outrage cycle serves a real purpose here. It reassures the public that corruption is anomalous and scandalous, rather than routine. Individual resignations substitute for structural reform. The working class is invited to be angry, but never empowered to alter the incentives that make such behavior rational in the first place. They are the 'two minutes hate' of our time, if the reader can forgive the overused reference.
  5. The surveillance state emerges as the main enterprising and logical solution to managing populations rendered unstable as a result of these self-perpetuating and restless conditions. Precarity requires monitoring. Debt requires tracking. Digital identity collapses the distance between behavior and consequence. Credit scores, biometric data, health metrics, and predictive analytics converge not out of malice, but out of administrative convenience. Once the technology exists, not using it is framed as irresponsible. Competition between states accelerates this process, each justifying expansion by pointing to the advancements of others. What begins as security ends as pure and simple compliance.
  6. Neurotechnology and brain-computer interfaces represent the final and everlasting frontier of this logic. If attention, emotion, and cognition can be measured and influenced, they can be monetized. The rhetoric mirrors that of previous technological waves. Productivity, accessibility, enhancement. The reality is simpler. The last remaining private space, the interior of the mind, becomes legible, consumable, commercially available and effortlessly readable to private market forces. Consent becomes meaningless when participation is tied to employment, healthcare, or social inclusion. Opting out is rebranded as backwardness and primitivism. Privacy is branded as foolish and suspicious.
  7. And in this environment, art loses its value not because creativity disappears, but because meaning is flattened. When cultural production is optimized for engagement metrics and automated reproduction alone, human intention becomes incidental rather than emotionally sufficient by itself or explainable through explicitly human terms, which neither the legal code nor the business apparatus of globalism even really cares for. Art becomes content, and content becomes filler, which is evaluated by how well it is monetized. The tragedy is not that machines create, but that humans are encouraged to create as machines do. Faster, louder, more legible. What cannot be quantified is discarded. What cannot be monetized is marginalized. Our art is being dumbed down to appeal to the dumbest possible demographic, only because it is already the largest possible demographic, and only because that is the demographic the system needed to breed and instill in powerful positions during the duration of the Industrial Revolution, and the demographic it has upheld to beat the intelligent members of the working class into relentless bureaucracy through schooling, economic suppression and force for literal generations across the world, for the gain of very few, and the theatre of public dismay.
  8. These conditions feed into one another seamlessly. Surveillance requires data extraction. Data extraction requires commodified subjects. Commodified subjects require economic instability. Instability requires narrative distraction. Narrative distraction requires endless cultural production.

The ICE debate, the Gaza debate, the Ukrainian conflict, the culture wars, the moral panics, the pandemic discourse, the theatre of cruel political debate on national stages ending in political violence and widespread commercialization and meaningless condemnation of it, all function within this loop, all support it, all reinforce and help and build upon it, and all do so on purpose. They are not irrelevant, but they are displaced, like every marginalized political force within this country. Energy is expended where resolution is impossible, while the underlying machinery continues unchallenged. You cannot challenge it, and being aware of it emulates the Rocco's Basilisk, in itself being a theoretical curse. And yet, you must live it, and prevail as being truly 'human', and on top of that, a person of action, regardless of circumstance.

To observe this without illusion is not cynicism. It is the first step towards true and actionable clarity. The refusal to reduce every issue to partisan morality is not neutrality, but seriousness. Until these systems are confronted as systems, debates will continue to orbit symptoms, and politics will remain a theater of managed conflict and spectacle rather than a site of genuine change.

Have a nice Saturday night. Don't forget to drink some tea and meditate.

Friday, January 2, 2026

Short Story: Irregularities in the Water

Twenty-one. There were exactly twenty-one separate dots on the paper, some milk-white, most soot-black, each paired in a tight curl like a brood of small yin and yang seeds, as if each speck meant to clasp its own shadow and, clasping it, make a whole that no one could split without first splitting their own sight. It felt staged for her, not in the grand way of curtains and footlights, but in the mean, close way of a trap set for a shrew, baited with a crumb that looks like mercy. It was as if the room had been waiting for her to arrive at the page, and the page had been waiting for her to arrive at the dots.

Before she had eyes that knew to name, ears that knew to sort, a nose that knew to rank smoke from soap, before she had the hard little peg of self that people jam into the soft mind and call a person, she could still feel it all, she could still take in the lot of it, the warm and the chill, the sweet and the sour, taught by no hand and yet taught, taught by the tongue itself as it flips and finds, taught by the skin as it takes sun and then takes shade, taught by the mouth as it gulps down a sweet lump in a child’s lap with the brisk haste of a summer gust, and then, on some other day, in the same bright play-world, takes the wrong taste from the wrong wall and learns that not all pale things are kind. All of that came back now, nearly thirty years later, not by prayer, not by drink, not by the slow work of time, but by these dots, these small black weights, these cursed pinpricks, these neat little marks as if dripped from a tool that never shakes.

It was strange, how the mind can keep a store of touch and taste like jars on a shelf, and yet let slip the one craft that should be plain, the craft of telling one face from the next. She had the sense, sharp and sure as a cut, that the bit in her head that once set a mother’s brow apart from a nurse’s, that once knew her own from a stranger’s, had gone dull, had gone slack, had shut its shutters. She was sure it had worked at some point, because she could still call up faces from the old schoolroom with its chalk dust and its damp coats, she could still see, with a kind of sick clearness, the girl with the snaggle tooth, the boy with the raw red hands in winter, the teacher with the tight bun like a knot in rope; she could almost see her mother too, almost, in the way you can almost see a coin at the bottom of dark water if you tilt your head and the light hits right. She could even summon, with a spiteful thrift, the face of the boy who had pressed her into the back of a Toyota Camry behind a Wendy’s and made a crude rite of it, and then, as if the hurt were a joke told for him alone, had put a lit end of a cigarette to her arm and looked away while the skin learned its new law. That face she could see. That face came when called.

And yet the face across from her now would not hold. It slid. It would not click into place as male or female, old or young, kind or cold. It was a face made of features that refused to bind, like a map with its names rubbed off, like a mask left too long in sun. The voice, at least, was clear. Polite. Almost sing-song. A voice meant to be safe, meant to be the smooth handrail on a stair that is not safe at all. It lulled her. It tried to set a soft rhythm in her blood.

Maud Saffron could feel it all, she could feel the past flood up like a sink that will not drain, but the present would not stick. A sleepiness had come on her at once, not the honest sleep that follows a hard day, but a drag, a pull, as if the air had grown thick and her thoughts had to wade. She could not recall if she had eaten in the last hour, or drank, or if she had done either at all, not in the last hour and not in the last day, as if those acts had been cut from her run of time the way a dull clerk cuts a line from a form. She could not tell if she was sixteen or eighty. She could not, with any clean proof, state her own age the way she could state the dot count. She only knew that her childhood was thirty years or so ago, an odd span to claim with such calm, and yet it felt almost exactly that, almost, the way one can almost hit a nail on its head in the dark by feel. It must have been thirty years. It must have been. The number had the right weight.

And there were moments that stood out with a clean edge, moments set apart as if dropped onto a petri dish and watched under a lens, measured and named and then left to rot in plain sight. She knew what it felt like to be alive once, to make wrong turns, to be flawed, to be cruel in small ways and then loathe the self for it, to be a waste of space in her own verdict, drenched in shame like rain, and yet, as a child, she had not had that fear. As a child everything was now. Now was all there was. Now was thick and full and rude and bright.

Now, only the sound of the number twenty-one remained on the tip of her tongue, and with it the slow drip of saliva that comes to wet a thirst only to wet it and wet it again without ever touching the root of it, and the thought that came to replace the thought before it, and the relief that came to relieve what had been relieved before, until relief itself lost its meaning and became only another word to mouth, like “and,” like “the,” like “yes.”

“Can you tell the shape?” the sing-song voice asked.

Maud looked at the clustered curl of black and white. The dots did not feel like dots anymore. They felt like a net. They felt like a set of tiny eyes turned inward.

“Maybe a butterfly?” the voice offered, as if lending her a coat.

“A butterfly,” Maud replied. “Butterfly.”

“Yes. A butterfly.”

“Yes.”

She paused, but she also stayed still in her speech, and that was the odd part, the split part. She saw her own mouth move, saw it the way one sees a mouth in a bad video call, across a small gap, out of sync by a breath, and yet she did not feel her lips part. The words came out without the work of them. It was as if the talk belonged to someone else and she was only watching, a witness in her own skull.

Was it a dream? A bad dream? A day-dream that had slipped its leash? Her sight broke into parts. Indistinct bits, as if the world had been half-smeared by a thumb, as if a whole had been pushed into the middle of a stroke and left there, not yet negotiable into one clean piece. The dots on the paper, which had seemed like a tight small whole, began to unhook. She began to forget who she was when she came into the room.

When did she come here? Five odd years ago, when she had stood on a street in New York City with the press of bodies and the hard breath of subway grates and could not tell what kind of woman she meant to be, or eight odd years after the fight with her father about Harriet, her sister, Harriet whose name still had a hook in it, a snag? That fight had shocked the poor man into a kind of inward collapse, a belief that he had been at fault for Harriet’s ward and Harriet’s end, and perhaps he had, perhaps he had not, and it did not matter now because time would not arrange itself into clean steps. Maud could not tell if the arrow on the clock, the thin black arm with its blunt point, was going forward or back. She could not ask. Asking felt like a breach.

A woman. Was she. In the light of day and the midst of mist, in the false white light from the ceiling panels, in the small floating hairs that shed from heads and drift and glitter and make little fractal storms in air, in the fleeced fur hide that covers the skull and makes it seem warm and human, a skull held together like a bowling ball, like a melon, like a thing meant for sport, a thing that can be kicked or thrown or offered as meat to dogs, the skull that holds together a conscious run when a brain sits inside it. Though she could not tell if hers had arrived yet, or if it had long gone and would not return, much like Harriet.

The sing-song voice made a small note. Pen on paper. Scratch. Tick. A sound that should have been small and was not.

“Good,” the voice said. “And what makes it a butterfly?”

What makes it? As if there were a craft behind the saying? As if the task were not to see, but to show the gears of seeing?

Maud looked again. She felt the first answer harden inside her mouth like a lozenge that will not melt. Butterfly. Butterfly. The word had a cheap bright wing-beat to it, a child word. She did not trust it.

“The sides,” she said at last. “The symmetry. The split.”

“The split,” the voice repeated, and there was a soft lift in it, a pleased lift, as if Maud had said the right prayer in the right church.

The dots quivered, or perhaps her sight quivered, the way a cheap lens quivers when the hand shakes. The black spots were not all black. Some were deep brown, like old dried blood. Some were ink-gloss, wet looking though she knew they were dry. Some were a kind of dead matte, like soot pressed into paper with a thumb. She counted again without meaning to. Twenty-one. She could not stop.

The voice slid the first sheet aside and brought out the next, a fresh field. A new blot. A new bait.

“Card two,” it said, and the words “Card two” fell into her mind with the flat weight of a label stuck to a jar. She had the odd sense, sharp and wrong, that her own mind had shelves.

This one was not dots. This one was a smear, two halves pressed together, opened like a book and then left to dry. The shape was broad. The edges were clean in places and frayed in others, like cloth torn by teeth. It looked like a map of a place that does not exist, an island chain, a pair of lungs, a moth burnt at the wick.

Maud’s tongue touched the roof of her mouth. Her throat made a dry click. She did not mean to do it. It was a check. A self-check. She had always done checks. Finger to thumb, thumb to finger. Tongue up, tongue down. Count the ceiling tiles. Count the dots. Counting is a fence. Counting keeps the wolves out. If you can number a thing, it has an end.

“What do you see?” the voice asked, and she heard, beneath the sing-song, the hard rim of routine, the drill in it, the set steps of it, as if this were not talk but a run of prompts in a machine.

Maud’s first thought was not an image. It was a word, a word that did not feel like hers.

Vessel.

The word rose like a bubble from dark water, and she almost said it, almost, but the sound of it in her own mouth felt wrong, too old, too church-like, too full of hollow. She shut her lips. The silence swelled. She felt the room lean in.

“A mask,” she said instead, and the lie tasted thin. “A mask.”

The voice made its note again. Scratch. Tick.

“And what makes it a mask?” it asked, and the sing-song had slipped, just a hair, into something else. Not cruel. Not even cold. More like eager. More like hungry in a clean way.

“The holes,” Maud said, though there were no holes. “The eyes.”

“Whose eyes?” the voice asked, and that was not in the script, she felt it was not, she felt it the way one feels a wrong step on a stair.

Maud blinked. The ink moved. The blot did not change on the paper, of course, but in her mind it changed, and that was worse. The edges pulled into curves that suggested cheeks. The dark center thickened like a mouth held shut. The symmetry began to look like a face pressed flat, a face made by force.

She tried to summon her sister’s face, Harriet’s face, not to answer, just to steady herself, to put a known face in her head to hold off the sliding unknown face across from her, but Harriet would not come. Harriet came as a name, as a thought, as a taste of pennies in the mouth, but not as a face. The face slot stayed blank.

“Can you tell if I am male or female?” Maud heard herself ask, and she had not meant to ask it, and yet the words had already left her.

There was a pause, the kind of pause that is too exact, too timed, too measured to be natural.

“I am your tester,” the voice said, still polite, still almost sing-song. “Please stay with the card.”

Tester. The word hung. Tester. Like a man who tests wire with a bare hand. Like a lab that tests mice. Like a blade that tests flesh.

Maud’s eyelids felt heavy. The air felt thick. The ink on the card seemed to have depth, as if it were not on the surface but under it, under the paper, under the thin white skin of it, like a bruise under flesh. She had the sick notion that the black was not ink at all, that it was some old ground matter, some ash, some pressed-down remains of something that once had heat.

She thought, with sudden rage, of forms. Of clerk hands. Of the way a ward makes a person into tags and checks and fields, and how a missing field can swallow a whole life without anyone screaming. She thought of Harriet’s name on a chart, Harriet’s wrist band, Harriet’s bed slot, Harriet’s out line left blank. She thought of her father’s hands shaking on the kitchen table as he said, for the thousandth time, “They did all they could,” as if “they” were a force like weather and not a set of hands.

“Card three,” the voice said, and the second card was slid aside, and the third came down like a lid.

This one was red as well as black, the kind of red that does not look like paint, the kind of red that looks like meat-water, like the stain left after a hunt. The shape was smaller, tighter, and yet it struck her harder, as if it had been made to fit some groove in her head.

Maud did not answer at once. The silence stretched. She felt the urge to fill it, to pay it off with words, any words, as one pays off a debt with coins scraped from a pocket.

She saw, all at once, a toy she had not thought of in years, a cheap plastic horse from a cereal box, yellowed with age, the kind of thing a child chews and then forgets. She saw a spoon. She saw the rough wool of a winter coat. She saw a hospital hallway with a striped floor. She saw a hand, not her own, moving a card from one pile to another.

“What do you see?” the voice asked, and the question did not sound like a question now. It sounded like a key being turned.

Maud’s mouth opened.

For a moment she could not tell what would come out, whether it would be her own word or the other word, the bubble-word, the word that had tried to rise before.

She tasted iron.

“A woman,” she said, and even as she said it she did not know whether she meant the shape or herself.

The voice made no note this time. No scratch. No tick. The lack of sound was louder than the sound had been.

Maud waited for the prompt that always comes next, the safe drill of it, the “what makes it that,” the “where do you see it,” the “anything else,” but instead the voice said, very softly, almost fondly, as if speaking to a child who has finally used the right term, “Yes. A woman.”

Maud blinked, and the red in the blot seemed to wet itself, to shine, to swell, and she had the odd, sharp thought that the card had been thirsty and her gaze had fed it.

Twenty-one, she thought, and the number did not belong here, and yet it rose again and again, the way a tune rises when you cannot stop it, and she felt, with a slow dread that had no clean source, that the dots on the first page had not been decoration, not at all, but a count of something that had been waiting, something that had always been waiting, not in the room, not in the clinic, but in her, under the words, under the old sense of self, down in the dark store where the mind keeps its jars and its tags and its missing lines.

“Maud,” the voice said.

She started, because she had not told the voice her name aloud, not once, and yet the voice had it with the ease of a hand finding a tool in its own belt.

“Yes,” Maud said.

“Good,” the voice said, and the sing-song was back, and that, strangely, was worse. “Now tell me what else you see.”

She did as she had been taught, though she could not recall the teaching and could only feel the pressure of it, the old pressure that rises in a throat when a question is put with kindness and therefore cannot be refused without seeming monstrous, and she looked again and again as the cards advanced in their ordained order, black then red then black again, each plate a small court in which she must testify against her own sight, and each time she spoke she felt the words pass through her as through a thin reed, taking on a tone not quite hers, a timbre that seemed to have been practiced elsewhere, perhaps in other mouths, perhaps in the mouth that had once been Harriet’s, perhaps in some mouth now dust, now locked, now stored, now waiting in a dark place where paper does not yellow and ink does not fade.

“What else,” the voice would ask, not harshly, not even firmly, but with that syruped sing-song that makes refusal feel like breaking a toy in a child’s hand, and Maud would offer a second answer, and then a third, and sometimes she would hear herself begin the sentence and hear the voice finish it, as if they shared a single breath between them, as if speech were a rope pulled hand over hand from her into the other, and the scratch of the pen would return, and the pen would sometimes pause in mid-air as if awaiting a particular noun, a particular hinge-word, a particular small confession that would let the page close.

She began to notice that the cards did not merely invite images but invited a certain kind of grammar, a syntax of split and mirror and paired halves, and when she spoke of symmetry the voice brightened, and when she spoke of faces the voice grew quiet, and when she spoke of anything that lived, anything with wings or limbs or eyes, the room itself seemed to lean, as though life were the very scent the place had been built to draw in, and Maud, who had always thought of her mind as a private chamber, began to feel it as a hall with doors on both sides, doors that other feet might use if they knew the pattern.

At some point, which she could not time because time had ceased to be a straight rail and had become instead a coil of wire in a drawer, the tester asked her to repeat her own name, a simple grounding task, the sort of humane little trick used to steady a person who is drifting, and Maud opened her mouth to say Maud Saffron and found that the syllables were not seated where she had left them; they were present, yes, but present as a label is present on a jar, and behind them, behind the paper-thin tag of them, another name pressed up as if from the underside of the tongue, a name with softer edges and an older warmth, and she did not say it, not yet, but she tasted it like a penny held between lip and gum, metallic and undeniable.

“Again,” the voice said, still gentle, as if coaxing a child to pronounce a new word, and Maud tried again and felt the act of naming as a kind of lifting, the way one lifts a lid and discovers the jar is not empty but full of something that is not what the label promised.

The cards went on, and she went on, and in the going-on she began to lose the sense of beginning, which is a thing people do not value until it is taken, for without a beginning every thought is only continuation and therefore belongs as much to any other mind as to one’s own; and she began to lose the sense of ownership in her own recollections, so that when the old schoolroom came it did not come with her small body seated at a desk but came as a view from the doorway, and when the hospital corridor came it came not with her hand held tight in her father’s but as a quick bright glance from a bed-height, and she felt, with a slow bewildered dread, that the memory was being re-lit from another angle, that the same scene had been stored twice and now the second store was being opened.

The tester’s face, still ungraspable as sex or age, grew in Maud’s sight less like a person and more like a surface, like a pane of glass in which her own features might be tried on and adjusted, and she found herself studying the mouth not to read emotion but to read procedure, the way one watches a metronome and learns the beat, and she noticed that the tester’s questions never truly asked for meaning but asked for mechanism, never What is it but What makes it so, never Who but How, as if the work were not to see but to surrender the hidden gears by which seeing becomes belief.

A thought came then, quiet as a hair settling on a sleeve, that the inkblots were not pictures but gates, and that her answers were not answers but keys she was forging in real time, each key cut by her own habits of mind, each tooth filed by her own favored metaphors, until at last there would be a key that fit, and when it fit it would not open the card but open her.

She tried to resist, but resistance requires a firm self, and the self was precisely what had begun to soften, to smear, to become like wet ink pressed between two sheets, and when she attempted to think, I will not, she heard instead a milder sentence, a sentence that sounded like a thought but behaved like an instruction, and she did not know from where it came, only that it sat in her mind with the same flat authority as a printed line on a form.

The voice said her name again, and Maud felt the name land on her like a tag tied to a toe, not cruelly, simply, as if tagging were a kind of care, and then the voice asked her to look at the next card and tell what she saw, and Maud saw, with a clarity that made her stomach turn, not a bat or a moth or a mask, but a pair of hands washing a pair of hands, as if one set were being scrubbed from the other, and she heard herself say, “It is cleaning,” and the voice replied, “Yes,” as if pleased, as if the word had been needed, as if the word had been missing.

It was then, or perhaps it was much later and only seemed then because dread makes clocks stutter, that she became aware of the page-like nature of the cards, their rectitude, their hush, their insistence on being looked at in a certain way, from a certain distance, for a certain span, and she thought, with a sudden uncanny shame, of the way you are looking now, the way a reader must look, the way the eye takes in black forms on white ground and cannot help but make them into sense, cannot help but supply the life behind the mark, and she wondered whether the test had truly begun in the room at all, or whether it had begun earlier, in the first moment someone agreed to interpret.

For a while, she spoke less, and the voice spoke more, offering suggestions with the same soft helpfulness that a map offers, and Maud found herself accepting the offered shape with a relief that frightened her, because it is a terrible comfort to have meaning handed to you, and worse to notice how eagerly you take it; and each time she accepted the offered meaning the card seemed to settle, as if the ink had been waiting not for her to see but for her to consent, and in the settling she felt something settle behind her eyes, like a new lens being seated.

The first overt sign, though it did not feel overt in the moment and only later would she understand its grossness, was that she began to answer before the question had fully landed, as if the answer were queued, as if the answer were already on a rail and only needed the signal to depart, and she heard herself say words that she had not intended, words with a public quality, words like announcements, and she wondered why her mind had begun to speak to itself in that tone, that tone of general instruction addressed to no one and therefore to everyone.

The tester said, “Good,” and the pen scratched, and Maud felt her thoughts begin to arrange themselves into short imperatives, into safe little phrases, into the sort of language that assumes a crowd and therefore erases the singular; and she tried to think of Harriet again, and now Harriet came not as a sister but as a rule, as a caution, as a line on a sign, as a thing said over and over until it loses blood and becomes habit.

The room grew very still, and in that stillness, in that uncanny lull between one card and the next, Maud felt the faintest shift, as if a chair in her mind had been pulled out from under her without noise, and she realized that she could not remember, with any certainty, what she had answered on the first card, nor what she had answered on the second, and that she could not remember her own forgetting either, only the present demand to continue, to comply, to interpret, to keep the ink alive by feeding it meaning.

“Now tell me what else you see,” the voice said again, but now it did not sound as though it came from across the table, it sounded as though it came from within the same skull-space as her own thoughts, and Maud, who had long ago learned to obey inner voices even when they were only echoes of outer ones, opened her mouth and felt the beginning of speech form with a peculiar tenderness, as if the tongue were not merely muscle but an instrument being tuned, three long syllables rising toward the palate and returning again, not words yet, but the promise of words, the pure shape of compliance before meaning stains it.

Please mind the gap between the train and the platform  and stand clear of the closing doors, please and see it, say it, sorted and please place the item in the bagging area and unexpected item in the bagging area and please take your receipt, the phrases stepping one by one like polished boots across the bridge of the tongue, each small command dressed as courtesy, each courtesy hiding its hook, the soft sibilants and clipped plosives making their neat progress up to the tip and back again, as if speech were a commuter current and her mouth only the station through which it must pass, as if the simplest daily utterance could be made into a key by repetition and rhythm and the tender violence of being said for you, and said in you, and said through you, and if you see something, say something, and mind the closing doors, and please mind the gap between the train and the platform and stand clear of the closing doors, please and please place the item in the bagging area and unexpected item in the bagging area and please take your receipt, until the meanings thin and the music remains, and the music begins to sound, very faintly, like your own.

Maud tried to obey, for obedience had always been her first posture in a room with clean walls and a voice that sounded as though it had rehearsed kindness in a mirror, and yet the instant she turned her gaze back upon the card, upon that wet-looking red which was not wet and upon that black which was not merely black but seemed to have a depth like a bruise beneath paper, she felt the strange recoil of her own mind, as if some inward clerk had stamped the sight as forbidden and yet, having stamped it, had also filed it where it could be found again, and found again, and found again, until finding became a kind of doom.

“Tell me,” said the voice, and it was no longer merely prompt but permission, no longer the civil tone of a tester but the low sure tone of one who expects confession and grants it in the same breath, as if the telling itself were the absolution of having seen; “do not be afeared of what rises, for what rises was already in thee.”

Maud’s mouth opened, and she felt, with a flash of animal panic, that she was not opening it, that the hinge was being used, that the tongue was being played like a reed-pipe by fingers she could not see, and still she tried, she tried with the frantic cunning of a dreamer in paralysis who knows he must move and cannot, she tried to seize her own speech before it left her, to hold it like spit in a closed mouth, but the syllables came regardless, and with the syllables came a knowledge that did not belong to her, a knowledge that behaved like a memory and yet had no childhood attached to it.

“Herypastabyllkane,” she heard herself say, and the name was ugly in the mouth, not because it was hard but because it fit too well, because it sat on the tongue as though the tongue had always been shaped for it, and in saying it she understood, with a clarity that felt like nausea, that the inkblots were not merely inkblots and not merely tests, but a set, a rite, a keyed instrument, and that the key was not hidden in the paper but in the watcher.

The face across from her, the ungraspable face, softened into stillness, and the voice lowered further, almost tender, almost private, so that Maud felt she was hearing it inside her own skull rather than through air.

“Very good,” the voice said. “Now we may speak with her.”

With her.

Maud’s hands went cold, and she tried to name herself again, she tried to hammer Maud Maud Maud into the center of her thought as one hammers a nail into wood to prove the wood is solid, but the name splintered and would not hold, and in the splintering there came, like a child’s face pressed suddenly against a windowpane, another presence, small and fierce and terribly familiar, a presence that did not push like an intruder but rose like a drowned thing that has at last found air.

“No,” Maud whispered, and it was not the sort of no that refuses, but the sort of no that marks the instant the trap has closed.

“Hush,” said the voice, and the hush was not command but comfort, the hush one gives to a sobbing child, and that comfort made Maud’s terror sharper, for comfort is a way of taking a person apart without their noticing which pieces have been removed; “Maud is weary, Maud is full of old filings and rust, Maud has carried what was not hers, and now the burden may pass.”

Maud’s thoughts began to lengthen, to stretch into strange archaic coils, as if the modern quickness of her mind were draining away and leaving behind some older manner of thinking, slow and ceremonial and thick with subordinate clauses, the sort of thinking that feels like candlelight on stone, and she understood, in the same instant, that the thickening was not poetic but terminal, that it was the mind’s final reach for dignity as it is emptied.

“Harriet,” the voice said, and the name struck Maud like a bell heard underwater, muffled yet undeniable; “thou hast tarried long, little one. Art thou there.”

A sob rose in Maud that did not belong to Maud, a sob with a child’s shape, and she felt her own eyes sting while somewhere behind the sting a different pair of eyes seemed to open, eyes that had been shut for thirty years and now blinked at light as if light were a stranger.

“I am,” said Maud’s mouth, and Maud did not intend it, and Maud did not consent, and still it was said, and the voice on the far side of the table answered as though it had been waiting its whole life to hear that syllable.

“Speak,” it said. “Tell me what thou seest.”

Maud tried then, with the last hard remnant of self that remained, to do what she had always done when frightened, which was to describe, to count, to render the world into words and thereby keep it outside, but the describing turned upon her like a blade, because the moment she tried to tell what the inkblots were, she felt the inkblots tell what she was, and each description she formed became not a fence but a doorway.

She saw them all at once, not ten cards in sequence but ten cuts into the same wound, each plate a different angle on the same thing that could not be held in one view, and because she had become aware of them, because she had named their set and thus acknowledged their existence as more than paper, they began to seize her vessel, not as a hand seizes a cup but as a mold seizes liquid, giving it shape by refusing it any other.

Card one, the twenty-one dots, milk-white and soot-black in paired curls, the neat seed-spirals that pretend to be yin and yang but are in truth small mouths biting their own tails, and when you stare long enough the dots cease to be dots and become eyes, and the eyes cease to be eyes and become holes, and the holes become the absence of a face where a face ought to be.

Card two, the pressed smear like a book opened and dried, whose edges fray like cloth torn by teeth, which is a map, which is lungs, which is a moth burnt at the wick, which is two hands washing two hands, which is also a chalice tipped on its side, and the chalice is also a cradle, and the cradle is also a coffin, and whichever word you choose is the one that chooses you back.

Card three, red and black, meat-water red, hunt-stain red, a shape that fits a groove in the head, and when you call it woman it answers yes, and when it answers yes it drinks your gaze like water.

Card four, the heavy black that looks like fur and bark and old felt, a king-shape, a judge-shape, a door-shape, and if you say door you hear, without meaning to hear, stand clear of the closing doors, please, and the phrase repeats until the door is not a door but your own mouth closing.

Card five, the clean bat-butterfly that is always offered as safe, the symmetrical mercy, the easy answer, the child-word that makes the room pleased, and the pleasure is the hook.

Card six, the pelt, the hide, the thickened ink like animal skin, and if you say hide you remember hiding, and if you remember hiding you become small enough to be hidden away.

Card seven, the delicate forms like two girls facing each other, or two vases, or nothing at all but the suggestion that something is missing, and the missing becomes the center of your mind.

Card eight, the bright spread with colors like bruises in bloom, and the colors are not colors but flavors, sweet and sour, warm and chilled, and the tongue flips and finds and cannot stop.

Card nine, the spill, the cloud, the something that cannot be agreed upon, and in the disagreement your self thins, because self is agreement with oneself.

Card ten, the riot of marks that pretends to be many things, and in being many things it teaches the mind to become many, and in becoming many it teaches the mind to stop being one.

Maud tried to say this, tried to get it all out as if vomiting could save her, and the effort contorted her inwardly, so that her thoughts came in a rush and then stalled, came and then snagged, and she felt herself locked behind her own eyes like a person sealed behind glass, watching her own lips move with a distance that grew wider each second, and still she fought, still she fought with the desperate mania of someone banging from inside a coffin lid, and the banging took the form of description, because description was the only motion left to her.

“They are not pictures,” she tried to say, and what came out was, “They are not pictures,” but the sentence belonged to no one, it floated in the room like disinfectant smell; “they are teeth, they are keys, they are—”

“Hush,” said the voice, and now the hush was spoken not to Maud but to the thing rising within Maud, as one speaks softly to a timid creature one wishes to coax into the open; “thou art safe. Look not upon the terror, little one. Look only upon what is given. Tell me thy garden. Tell me thy sun. Tell me thy sister.”

Maud’s mind reeled, because the word sister should have anchored her and instead it loosened her, it pulled up the last peg of Maud’s identity from the soft ground of memory, and the hole where the peg had been filled at once with something else, something older, something that fit too perfectly.

“I cannot move,” Maud’s thought screamed, though no sound matched it; “I cannot, I cannot,” and the scream became archaic as it ran out of modern breath, becoming I may not, I may not, I am undone, I am unmade, as if even her terror were being translated into an older tongue to suit the one who was taking her place.

“Harriet,” said the voice again, and there was in it the intimacy of certainty, the assurance of one who has heard the same confession a thousand times and knows, before it is spoken, the shape of the sin and the shape of the pardon; “thy name is thine. Say it.”

Maud tried to keep her mouth shut, but the mouth opened.

“Harriet,” said Maud’s mouth.

And at that, something in Maud went quiet, not all at once, not as a lamp is switched off, but as a fire dies when the air is slowly starved from it, so that the flame grows long and blue and then retreats into ash, leaving behind only warmth without light, and warmth itself fades.

A small laugh came out, high and startled, not Maud’s laugh, not the bitter adult sound Maud had learned to make to survive, but a child’s laugh, the sound of surprise at being heard.

“That is good,” said the voice, and now it spoke directly to Harriet, and Harriet answered as if she had always been sitting there, as if she had never been gone, as if she had only been waiting behind a thin screen for someone to call her by her true name.

“I see,” Harriet said, and her words were simpler, not because she was dull but because she was young, and youth has not yet learned to pad truth with ornament; “I see a butterfly.”

“And what makes it a butterfly,” the voice asked, still in the old drill, but now the drill had become lullaby.

“The wings,” Harriet said, and there was wonder in it, the plain wonder of a child who trusts her own sight.

Maud, if any remnant of Maud remained, could only watch this wonder as one watches one’s own funeral from behind a curtain, unable to weep because the muscles of weeping no longer answer, unable even to name grief because grief requires a self who claims ownership of loss.

Harriet blinked, and the blink did not feel heavy, did not feel drugged, did not feel like drowning, but felt like blinking in a garden when sun is bright, and with that blink her mind, newly seated in the vessel, reached for what it knew, not for wards and forms and barcodes, but for the green old particulars of childhood.

“I used to play hide and seek,” Harriet said suddenly, without being asked, because memory in a child runs on its own rails and does not wait for permission; “in the garden, where the dirt is soft by the lilac bush, and Maud always counted too loud, she counted like she wanted me to hear, one, two, three, and I would laugh and put my hands over my mouth, and the ants would crawl on my shoes, and the sun would make the leaves look like glass.”

The tester’s voice softened further.

“Tell me of Maud,” it said.

Harriet smiled, and the smile was bright as a coin, and Maud, behind the smile, felt nothing but the fading echo of having once been able to smile.

“She was big,” Harriet said, and big meant older, big meant safe, big meant the one who knows where the best hiding places are; “she had a red ribbon once, and she tied it to the apple tree, and she told me it was a flag for a secret country and I was the queen, and she would bow like a silly knight, and then we ate strawberries from a bowl and the juice ran down my wrist and she wiped it with her thumb.”

“Yes,” said the voice, as if savoring each detail like a proof; “yes. Good. Continue.”

Harriet continued, and with each fond particular she grew more real in the body, as if the vessel accepted her more fully the more she could furnish it with innocence, with sunlight, with the remembered weight of a sister’s hand, and Maud’s last remnants, if they existed at all, were pushed into a smaller and smaller corner, into a place without language, without name, without even the relief of screaming, for screaming is a kind of identity too.

A door opened somewhere behind Harriet, and another voice entered, brisker, lower, not sing-song, a working voice, a voice that belonged to corridors and clipboards.

“Status,” said the new voice.

The tester did not look away from Harriet, did not break the soft confessional cadence, and yet answered with the calm of a craftsman reporting a finished joint.

“Transfer is seated,” the tester said. “The Maud layer is down. The Harriet conscience is primary.”

“And the trigger,” said the other voice.

“The Herypastabyllkane Inkblots,” said the tester, and the name sounded now like a brand, like a patent, like something printed on a box; “they do not seize the unknowing. They require recognition. They require the subject to apprehend the set as a set, to hold the exact shapes in awareness, which is to say, to complete them.”

“Complete them,” the other voice repeated.

“Yes,” said the tester, and there was a faint satisfaction in it, the satisfaction of a method proven; “the subject believes she is merely seeing, but she is in truth supplying the missing half, and once the missing half is supplied, the vessel becomes legible.”

“Hospitalize the new resurrected subject,” said the other voice, as if reading an order.

“Yes,” said the tester, and then, as if to soothe Harriet, the tester returned at once to the gentle tone and asked, “And where did you hide, little one, when Maud counted?”

“In the tall grass by the fence,” Harriet said, delighted, unaware of anything but the garden; “and I could see her shoes, and she pretended not to see me, and when she found me she said I was the best hider in the world.”

If you are reading or listening to this, you have already done it, because you have already pictured the dots and the smear and the red and the heavy black and the bright spread, you have already held them long enough to make them into something, and making is the same act, in the end, as opening, and the opening is the same act as letting in, and you will tell yourself, as all readers tell themselves, that it is only a story and therefore safe, as though safety were granted by paper, as though ink were not precisely the old device by which one mind reaches into another, and you will feel, perhaps, a small sting of guilt at having made Maud and Harriet in the first place, at having minted them from your want, at having dressed them in names and grief and childhood light, at having used them as furniture for your own curiosity, and you will want to shut the book, to close the page, to stand clear of the closing doors, please, but closing is not the same as undoing, and the mind, once it has completed a pattern, cannot pretend it did not.

Please mind the gap between the train and the platform, stand clear of the closing doors, please, if you see something, say something, please place the item in the bagging area, unexpected item in the bagging area, please take your receipt, the phrases sliding along the tongue with that odd daily holiness of the habitual, those clipped little imperatives that rise to the tip and return again, over and over, as if speech were a wheel and the tongue its rim, and you will notice, perhaps only faintly at first, that the simplest sentence you form in your head now comes preloaded with someone else’s cadence, someone else’s calm, someone else’s gentle certainty, and that somewhere, very softly, a voice is saying your name the way a tester says Harriet, not asking, not guessing, but knowing.

The Last Human Summer

A little essay. On physicalism, Nietzsche, Mishima, the aristocracy of the soul, the death of the gods, and why I think we have forgotten wh...